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INTRODUCTION
As the nature of the American family changes, family law also
changes.' One rapidly emerging area of family law is the legal right
of grandparents to visit with their grandchildren.2 In response to the
increasing number of unmarried or divorced parents, the existence
of step-families, the estrangement of extended families,' the decrease
1. See Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Services of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 House Hearing] (statement of Dr. Andre Derdeyn, Director, University of
Virginia Child and Family Psychiatry Training Program) (explaining that "changes in the field
of child custody and visitation in the United States which have occurred over most of the last
three hundred years have evolved gradually as part of other social changes"); see also Ross A.
Thompson et al., Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Legalizing the Ties That Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOL.
1217, 1217 (1989) (suggesting that policy makers must be careful not to change nature of
families through laws, but merely create laws to accommodate those changes in family life that
have already occurred).
2. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 71 (statement of Dr. Andre Derdeyn, Director,
University of Virginia Child and Family Psychiatry Training Program) (noting that grandparent
visitation statutes "have burst quite recently upon the scene").
3. See Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Ky. 1989) (explaining that "grandparents'
visitation statute was an appropriate response to the change in the demographics of domestic
relations, mirrored by the dramatic increases in the divorce rate and in the number of children
born to unmarried parents, and the increasing independence and alienation within the
extended family inherent in a mobile society"); randparents'Rights: Preserving GenerationalBonds:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Servie of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 House Hearing] (statement of Rep. Snowe) (noting that soaring
divorce rates, increased family mobility, fractured extended families, and politically active
grandparents with increased life spans have resulted in increased focus on grandparent visitation
laws); Sara S. Rorer, Comment, Grandparents' Vitation Rights in Ohio: A Procedural Quagmire, 56
U. CN. L. REv. 295, 296 (1987) (indicating that grandparent visitation statutes arose in response
to rising divorce rate and changing attitudes about child custody);Joseph L. Galloway & Patricia
A. Avery, America's Forgotten Resource: Grandparents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 30, 1984, at
76, 76 (reporting that social changes in recent years, including increased mobility and high
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in the number of grandchildren,4 and the increased longevity of
grandparents,5 all fifty states, but not the District of Columbia, have
enacted statutes giving grandparents visitation rights.6 These statutes
are due largely to the well-organized efforts of grandparents and their
supporters, who have joined together to ensure that the law preserves
the "special" relationship between grandparents and grandchildren.
7
divorce rates, have resulted in loss of grandparent-grandchild relationships).
4. See Sarah H. Matthews & Jetse Sprey, The Impact of Divorce on Grandparenthood: An
Exploratory Study, 24 GERONTOLOGIST 41, 45 (1984) (noting that decrease in number of
grandchildren in United States due to declining birth rate would logically result in greater
efforts by grandparents to ensure grandparent visitation rights).
5. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Rep. Snowe) (noting that
grandparents are retiring earlier, living longer, and becoming more politically active); see also
1982 House Hearing; supra note 1, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Biaggi) (noting that current life
expectancies suggest that adults will spend 20 to 30 years of their lives as grandparents);Judith
L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 118, 121 (1986) (noting that longer life expectancies increase average amount of time
person will spend as grandparent).
6. SeeALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989); ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-337.01 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-
59 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01
(Harrison Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7)
(Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/607(b) (1) (Smith-
Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Bums Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West
Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin
1991); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 132(B) (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1001-1004
(West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39(d)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25-312(7b) (Callaghan 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.022 (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.402
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1988);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.340 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:2-7.1 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72
(McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.051 & 3109.11 (Anderson 1972 & Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5311-12 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-24.1 through 15-5-24.3 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
420 (33) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52 through 25-4-54 (1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-16 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2
(Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-
2B (1993); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-113(c) (1987); see also
Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and
Suppor 25 FAM. L.Q. 19, 52-53 (1991) (including chart of all 50 grandparent visitation statutes
and respective enactments); Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory risitation Rights of Grandparents: One
Step Closer to the Best Interests of the ChiKl 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 387-401 (1977) (recording that
in 1977 only six states had grandparent visitation statutes).
7. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Downey) (claiming that
senior citizens are "the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to grandparents
there is no one group more united in their purpose"); GRANDPARENT VISITATION DIsPUTEs: A
LEGAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1 (Ellen C. Segal & Naomi Karp eds., 1989) [hereinafter GRANDPAR-
ENT VISITATION MANUAL] (reporting that grandparents are becoming increasingly vocal about
being denied visitation rights with grandchildren); Edward M. Bums, Grandparent Visitation
Rights: IsIt Time for the Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L. Q. 59, 59 (1991) (acknowledging that older
Americans currently are more vocal about expressing their concerns than they had been
previously); Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dissension More
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The legal entitlement of grandparents to visit with their grandchil-
dren, however, remains in a state of flux.8 The Supreme Court has
traditionally deferred to state legislatures and state courts on family
law matters, particularly on grandparent visitation rights.9 The
Pronounced, 55 AM.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 277, 282 (1985) (suggesting that increased demand for
grandparent visitation rights is due to today's generation of healthier, more powerful
grandparents and to receptive legislators who recognize political power held by grandparents);
Matthews & Sprey, supra note 4, at 45 (theorizing that expanding kinship systems due to divorce
and decrease in number of grandchildren due to declining birth rate have combined to
encourage grandparents to make concerted efforts to protect relationships with their
grandchildren); Katrine Ames, Grandma Goes to Court, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 67, 67 (stating
that "[v]isitation rights have become one of the most emotional issues of the growing
grandparents' movement").
Several organizations assist grandparents in pursuing visitation rights with grandchildren,
including Grandparents Anonymous, the Child Welfare League of America, the American
Association of Retired People, and the National Council of Senior Citizens. InJanuary of 1993,
approximately 200 people converged on the Georgia State Capitol for a candlelight vigil
expressing concern over the welfare of that state's children. Candlelight Vigil to Underscore Concern
for Geqia Children, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap File.
The vigil was organized by The Georgia Council for Children's Rights (GCCR) and included,
as part of the vigil, a listing of GCCR's six legislative goals for 1993, which included the
"protection of multi-generational relationships." Id. The vigil also included a tribute to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions to deny certiorari in cases upholding grandparents' visitation
rights. Id. (referring to King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630-33 (Ky.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 378
(1992) and H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803, 804-07 (Wisc.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992)).
Previously, in July of 1992, 50 groups supporting grandparents' rights merged in Washington,
D.C. to form the National Coalition of Grandparents. Sharon Theimer, Grandparents Pressing
Visitation Rights, LA. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at A4.
8. Although all fifty states have enacted some form of a grandparent visitation statute,
several states are currently considering legislation to amend their statutes. See, e.g., Ariz. S. 1422,
41st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (including stepgrandparents and great-grandparents among third
parties able to petition for visitation); Colo. H. 1224, 59th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1993)
(regarding grandparent visitation rights); Fla. S. 484, 13th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (1993) (providing
additional grounds for granting grandparent visitation and providing additional factors in
determining "best interests of the child"); Ga. H. 573, 142d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1993)
(providing further definitions regarding grandparent visitation); Ind. S. 92, 108th Leg. Sess.
(1993) (grantingvisitation to grandparents when custody has been given to grandparents' child);
Iowa S. 213, 72d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1993) (relating to grandparent visitation); La.
H. 663, Reg. Sess. (1993) (removing requirement that parents be interdicted, divorced, or dead
for court to award grandparents visitation); Md. S. 612, 407th Leg. Sess. (1993) (broadening
courts authority to grant grandparents visitation); Mich. S. 97, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993)
(deleting grandparent visitation rights provision from adoption code); Minn. S. 106, 78th Leg.
Sess. (1993) (regarding grandparentvisitation rights); Miss. H. 986, 162d Leg. (1993) (providing
grandparents visitation rights with adopted grandchildren); Mo. S. 264, 87th Leg. Assembly, 1st
Reg. Sess. (1993) (providing presumption that when parents are married, they know what is in
child's best interests regarding visitation); N.M. H. 225, 41st Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (1993) (relating
to grandparent visitation rights); Ore. H. 2588, 67th Leg. Assembly (1993) (allowing for
mediation in grandparent visitation disputes); W. Va. H. 2703, 71st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1993)
(relating to grandparent visitation rights).
9. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and, thereby, implicitly upheld state supreme
court decisions in King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630-33 (Ky.) (granting paternal grandfather
right to visit with his granddaughter over objections of child's married, natural parents), cert.
denieA 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992) and H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 803, 804-07 (Wisc.) (granting paternal
grandparents right to visit with grandchild despite adoption of child by stepfather), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 408 (1992). Both decisions boldly confirm the rights of grandparents to visit with
their grandchildren, despite adoption of a child by a stepparent or the desires of a child's
happily married, fit, natural parents to forbid visitation. These decisions will have a strong
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Court's recent decision to deny certiorari in state grandparent
visitation cases"0 provided little guidance to the states on how to
interpret the constitutional breadth and depth of grandparent
visitation rights.'
Congress has also refrained from acting on family law matters,
proceeding on the assumption that family law is an area of state
domain. 2 In 1983, Congress passed a resolution calling for the
adoption of a uniform state act on grandparent visitation rights.'
3
Despite mounting support for grandparent visitation rights, the
discussion and controversy this issue has generated,1 4 and additional
congressional hearings on the topic in 1991,15 the states have not
acted on Congress' call for a uniform act.1
Also contributing to the uncertainty of grandparent visitation is the
commonly used, but ill-defined, "best interests of the child" standard,
which is a lodestar for courts to determine whether grandparent
visitation should be allowed. 7 Because most grandparent visitation
impact on the continuing development of grandparents' visitation rights in the future and
enunciate some of the current fluctuations in the law regarding grandparent visitation.
10. See supra note 9 (discussing King v. King and H.F. v. T.F.).
11. See Theimer, supra note 7, at A4 (reporting that Supreme Court's rejection without
comment of parent's appeal in T.F. v. H.F. does not clarify for grandparents or lower courts
what rights of visitation grandparents actually possess or how extensive those rights are).
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enunciating powers of Congress, which do not encompass
power over family law or grandparents' visitation rights matters); U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); see alsoA BRIEFING BY THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN SERVICES OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, GRANDPARENTS:
NEw ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter 1992
Briefing] (stating that Congress does not have authority over family law matters); GRANDPARENT
VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 1 (asserting that state law traditionally governs domestic
relations).
13. S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 13,487 (1983) (enacted) ("[A]
uniform State act should be developed and adopted which provides grandparents with adequate
rights to petition State courts for privileges to visit their grandchildren following the dissolution
(because of divorce, separation, or death) of the marriage of such grandchildren's parents, and
for other purposes.").
14. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. Biaggi) (commenting that
upon announcement of House Hearings on grandparent visitation rights, there was "an influx
of calls and letters from across the Nation").
15. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Rep. Snowe) (noting that
purpose of hearing is to examine relationship between grandparent and grandchild).
16. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Downey) (noting that
although Congress attempted to indirectly resolve problem of grandparent visitation through
congressional resolution, states did not follow suit); 1992 Briefing supra note 12, at I (statement
of Rep. Downey) (noting that Congress has been unable "to influence the states to adopt
uniform grandparent visitation laws").
17. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of John H. Pickering, Chair,
Commission of Legal Problems of the Elderly, American Bar Association) (commenting that
judges render inconsistent decisions because many state grandparent visitation statutes do not
provide adequate standards and that highly defined, objective criteria would result in more
principled decisions); 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 73 (statement of Judith Areen,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family
566
1994] GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
statutes do not indicate how to determine what is in the best interests
of the child,"8 this difficult determination is left to the discretion and
proclivities of the presiding judge." Without guidance from the
statutes, most courts embrace the notion that grandparents' visitation
with grandchildren is beneficial." Thus, courts do not fully analyze
Medicine, Georgetown University Medical Center) (admitting that familiar standard of "best
interests of the child" is too vague); GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 12
(acknowledging that familiar "best interests of the child" standard is vague and too broadly
defined); Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24J. FAM. L. 393, 394
(1985-86) (noting that although "best interests of the child" is commonly used standard for
determining visitation rights, most courts fail to analyze specific needs of particular child
involved); Rebecca Brown, Grandparent Vuitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 133, 146-
47 (1991) (stating that primary problem with majority of states' grandparent visitation statutes
is that "best interests of the child" has not been defined by legislature, and thus courts have
enormous amount of discretion in deciding issue); Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1219
(noting that basic problem with grandparent visitation statutes is failure to define "best interests
of the child" standard).
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (1989 & Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-
103 (Michie 1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 9-102 (1991); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 72
(McKinney 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-1, -2 (1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240
(West 1989 & Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992); see alsoJudy
E. Nathan, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 633
(1984) (commenting that notion of "best interests of the child" defies precise definition);
Patricia S. Fernindez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 122 n.62
(1988) (stating that only three state statutes provide criteria for determining "best interests of
the child"). But see 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 73 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor
of Law, Georgetown, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University
Medical Center) (noting that although "best interests of the child" standard is too vague, it does
focus on child, who is one most likely to suffer as result of conflict between adult members of
family).
19. See Fermindez, supra note 18, at 123 (asserting that "in states without enumerated
criteria[,] the decisions are generally based on whatever criteria the judge feels is important").
20. See, e.g., Mimkom v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.Y. 1975). The court noted:
[A] very special relationship often arises and continues between grandparents and
grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts which commonly mar relations between
parents and children are often absent between those very same parents and their
grandchildren. Visits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's
experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the
relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship.
See also Bean, supra note 17, at 395 (articulating that most grandparent visitation cases presume
that child benefits as result of visitation, and that detrimental effect of visitation must be shown
to rebut presumed value of visitation); Ames, supra note 7, at 67 (noting psychologist's
comments that in almost every case it is in child's best interest to visit with her grandparents);
Galloway & Avery, supra note 3, at 76 (reporting comment of granddaughter that grandparent-
grandchild relationship is special and uniquely different from relationships with parents because
grandparents can be more objective and provide different perspective).
While a court's notion that visitation between grandparents and grandchildren is inherently
beneficial may be misplaced in terms of adjudicating the rights of the parties, grandparents
often play four important roles in the life of a child: first, they maintain the identity of the
family, mitigate disturbing events of the outside world for children, and provide a stabilizing
influence for children; second, grandparents can serve as "family watchdogs" for abuse or
neglect; third, grandparents may play arbitrators between parents and children; and finally,
grandparents allow children to build connections with their family history which can lead to a
firmer self-identity. See Fernindez, supra note 18, at 109-10 (citing Vern L. Bengston, Diversity
and Symbolism in Grandparental Roles, in GRANDPARENTHOOD 11, 21-24 (Vern L Bengston &Joan
F. Robertson eds., 1985)).
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whether the visitation rights at issue are truly in the best interests of
the specific child."
The expanding diversity of family relationships also creates difficulty
in determining the best interests of the child. As divorce and
distance splinter families, the number of people seeking visitation with
a child often increases.23 Most states agree that grandparents should
be granted visitation rights in certain situations, such as in the case of
a divorce or the death of a parent.24  States differ considerably,
however, on whether grandparents should be allowed visitation rights
after a child is adopted 25 or when the family is intact.
26
The lack of uniformity among grandparent visitation statutes,27 as
21. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992). The
Kentucky Supreme Court explained:
Ifa grandparent is physically, mentally and morally fit, then a grandchild will ordinarily
benefit from contact with the grandparent. That grandparents and grandchildren
normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact with the
other. The child can learn respect, a sense of responsibility and love. The grandpar-
ent can be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an insight into our changing
society, and can avoid the loneliness which is often a part of an aging parent's life.
Id.; see also Bean, supra note 17, at 394 (noting that "the best interest of the child is often
determined with scant reference to the needs of the particular child involved, and is
overshadowed by the court's desire to contribute to the maintenance of a grandparent-
grandchild relationship"); see also Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Function
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 226, 291 (1975) (criticizing visitation
analysis by best interests of the child standard because 
" [i] ndividualized adjudication means that
the result will often turn on a largely intuitive evaluation based on unspoken values and
unproven predictions").
22. See Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving and Owing, 95
W. VA. L. REV. 275, 279-97 (1992) (discussing influence of increasing family diversity on legal
regulation of family).
23. See SandraJ. Morris, Grandparents, Uncles, Aunts, Cousins, Friends: How is the Court to
Decide Which Relationships Will Continue?, FAM. ADV., Fall 1989, at 11, 13 (discussing logistical
difficulty presented by expansion of third party visitation).
24. See Brown, supra note 17, at 133 (stating that majority of states only permit grandparent
visitation where parents have separated or divorced or where one parent has died).
25. See GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 15-17 (describing various and
often conflicting state provisions concerning grandparents' rights after adoption).
26. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 117 (statement of Richard S. Victor, attorney)
(noting that Michigan grandparent visitation statute does not address intact family situation
because state legislature did not feel it should consider such controversial area); GRANDPARENT
VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 8-9 (observing that while handful of state statutes allow
visitation when family is intact, most states only intervene after divorce or death of parent).
27. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1992) (providing that courts may grant
grandparents reasonable visitation rights "regardless of marital status of the parents.., or the
relationship of the grandparents to the person having custody of the child; provided, however,
that when the natural or adoptive parents of the child are co-habiting as husband and wife,
grandparent visitation shall not be granted over both parents' objection") with KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991) ("The circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to..
. grandparents of a child ... if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.")
with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that "[t]he court may
award reasonable rights of contact with a minor child to any 3rd persons") with MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1991) (providing that after marriage ends "by divorce, annulment, or death,
an equity court may- (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation by a grandparent of a
natural or adopted child of the parties whose marriage has been terminated; and (2) if the court
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well as the inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of
grandparents' visitation rights by state courts, has increased litiga-
tion,28 litigation expenses,' and family animosity." This ambigu-
ity and lack of uniformity prevents parents and grandparents from
fully understanding their custody and visitation rights l and encour-
ages litigation. Consequently, judges decide visitation disputes. This
deprives the family of the opportunity to resolve the matter through
a more amicable and less traumatic proceeding, such as mediation,
2
that potentially could mitigate animosity and foster family under-
standing. Most importantly, the child, who is supposed to benefit
from these visitation laws, often suffers the most as a result of these
poorly defined statutes.
The highly emotional and contentious topic of grandparent
visitation rights deserves a comprehensive review to insure that
visitation laws appropriately reflect sociological changes in family
operation, and are not altering family structure. 3 The present
deficiencies in grandparent visitation laws highlight the need for
finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent") with
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991) (granting grandparents visitation rights "upon a finding that
such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the minor child," providing that this
statute "shall not apply in the case of any child who has been adopted by any person other than
a relative of the child or a stepparent of the child," and providing for grandparent visitation if
child is placed in foster home upon analysis of grandparents' past for determination of any
criminal wrongdoing) with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (1989) (providing that
grandparents may commence visitation petition '[iff a parent of a minor child is deceased,
physically or mentally incapable of making a decision or has abandoned the child," listing eight
factors to consider in determining childs best interests, and automatically terminating visitation
upon adoption by someone other than relative of child).
28. See Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1221 (suggesting that if grandparent visitation
rights were clearly enunciated, then both grandparents and parents would likely know outcome
of legal battle, and with knowledge of probable outcome, parties could settle their disputes).
29. See Galloway & Avery, supra note 3, at 76 (describing plight of New York couple that
spent $60,000 in legal fees over five years in effort to obtain visitation privileges with their two
grandchildren whose mother had died); Theimer, supra note 7, at A4 (noting that grandparents
accrued over $10,000 in legal fees in order to visit with their granddaughter for one day every
three months).
30. See Derdeyn, supra note 7, at 278-79 (noting that to bring visitation problem to court
for resolution, parties must have strong feelings of animosity for each other).
31. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 44 (statement of Mr. Shumway, grandfather)
(addressing implicit difficulties, but inherent importance, of formulating uniform grandparent
visitation statute, and pondering "how to develop a law that would be mechanical enough to
address your needs but human enough to allow some of these important factors to be taken into
consideration").
32. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 84 (statement of Richard S. Victor, attorney).
See generally infra notes 178, 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing need for and benefits of
mediation).
33. See Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1217 (asserting that poorly designed policies can
be particularly damaging in family law because "family law helps to define and institutionalize
family structure and roles, [and thus] well conceived revisions in family law are especially
important because they may not only reflect cultural changes in family life but also help to foster
them").
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greater continuity and stability in grandparent visitation statutes. A
clearly defined and widely adopted model grandparent visitation
statute would allow grandparents, parents, and children to know
where they stand in relation to the law and, thus, encourage intra-
family resolution of family visitation disputes.'
Part I of this Comment explores the constitutional background of
parental rights focusing on parent's rights to make child-rearing
decisions without state interference. Part II analyzes the history of
grandparents' rights and traces the development of grandparent
visitation statutes. Part III appraises two recent areas of expansion in
grandparent visitation statutes, the intact family and adoptions. Part
IV discusses the future of grandparent visitation rights and stresses
that legislators must be careful to codify social changes and not force
traditional notions of family by creating legally imposed visitation
rights. Part IV also discusses the importance of uniformity in
grandparent visitation rights, and the ways this uniformity can be
achieved. Pursuing uniformity, Part V proposes a model grandparent
visitation statute that is analyzed in Part VI.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. The State's Parens Patriae Interest
To understand the gravity of creating grandparent visitation rights,
it is necessary to analyze the rights traditionally held by parents.
Courts consistently recognize and protect family autonomy.35
Further, parents' freedom in child-rearing is a fundamental right that
courts have protected from unwarranted state interference.36  The
common-law concept that the state is the ultimate parent of every
child, parens patriae, is one of the only limitations on parental
34. See Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1221 (arguing that explicit standards regarding
grandparent visitation might allow families to "bargain in the shadow of the law" because clear
standards allow potential litigants to predict probable results of litigation, thereby diminishing
grandparent visitation cases and encouraging intrafhmily negotiations to resolve dispute).
35. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (confirming "historical
recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
36. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (declaring that "deeply rooted in our
Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure
of authority over one's children"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding
that "custody, care and nurture of [children should] reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing "the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
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autonomy.3 7 To protect parental autonomy, the Supreme Court has
developed a threshold test for the imposition of the state's parens
patriae interest." Generally, the state cannot interfere with the
parents' right to raise a child in a particular manner unless the
parents' practice endangers the child. 9
B. Rights of Parents to Raise Their Children Without Governmental
Interference
One of the principal Supreme Court decisions on parental rights
and childrearing is the 1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska.40 Meyer
addressed a state statute prohibiting foreign language instruction to
children prior to the ninth grade.41 The goal of the statute was to
instill children with American ideals and principles by grounding
them in the English language.42 The Court invalidated the statute,
concluding that parents may engage a foreign language instructor
because the Fourteenth Amendment grants parents the right to
"establish a home and bring up children" without governmental
interference.43
The Supreme Court reaffirmed parents' rights to raise a child
without state interference in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.' In Pierce, the
Court considered the validity of a state statute requiring parents to
send their children to public schools, a requirement that precluded
parents from sending their children to equivalent religious schools.45
As in Meyer, the Court recognized parents' rights to direct the course
of their children's upbringing without undue hindrance from the
37. See Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (explaining that court "is to put
[itself] in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent' ... and make provision for
the child accordingly.., by virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the [state] as parens
patriae"); see also Bean, supra note 17, at 407 (noting that "[f]amily autonomy... has most often
been limited by the state's parens patriae interest in protecting the children's welfare"); Roberta
Kotkin, Note, Grandparents Versus the State: A Constitutional Right to Custody, 13 HoFsTRA L. REV.
375, 385-87 (1985) (suggesting that parental autonomy may be trespassed "when some parental
act or omission triggers the interest and concern of the state"); Rorer, supra note 3, at 295
(noting that state may only intrude on family privacy under compelling circumstances).
38. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of Supreme Court test
for state intervention). See generally Bean, supra note 17, at 407-22 (describing development of
Supreme Court guidelines for state intervention in parents' right to raise child).
39. See Bean, supra note 17, at 422.
40. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
42. Id. at 393-94.
43. Id. at 399.
44. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-31 (1925).
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state and declared the statute invalid.'
C. Harm to the Child as the Determinative Test
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,47 the Supreme Court established the "harm
to the child" test to determine if a state has authority to invoke the
doctrine of parens patriae.4  In Yoder, Amish parents wanted to
prevent their child from receiving state-mandated secondary school
education.49 The Court acknowledged the potential for parents to
act contrary to the best interests of their child,5" but concluded that
if the parents' method of raising their child does not 'jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens,"" the State shall not interfere.52
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,"3 the Supreme Court
affirmed the "harm to the child" inquiry and the doctrine of parental
autonomy. 4 Lassiter involved an imprisoned mother whose parental
rights were terminated after she failed to have any contact with her
child, who was in foster care for over two years. 5 The Supreme
Court stated: "This Court's decisions have by now made plain [that]
. . .a parent's desire for and right to the 'companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children' is an important
interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection."'5 6
Thus, the Supreme Court has granted parents an extraordinary
amount of privacy and protection regarding the upbringing of their
child.57 Until recently, the only exception to parental autonomy was
46. Id. at 534-35; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that right to
raise one's children is essential and "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection"). In Stanley, an unmarried father challenged an Illinois law
that declared his children wards of the State upon the death of their mother merely because the
children's parents had never married. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. The Supreme Court held that
intervention by the State prior to a hearing on the father's fitness as a parent was a due process
violation. Id. at 649.
47. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
48. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 234.
52. See id. at 232 ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition
of parental concem for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.").
53. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
54. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
55. Id. at 20-21.
56. Id. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
57. See Fernandez, supra note 18, at 113 (asserting that parental judgment in matters of
nurturing child makes sense as practical matter because state does not have expertise or
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the state's parens patriae interest, which states could invoke only when
the parents' actions endangered a child. 8  The introduction of
statutory visitation rights for grandparents, however, places a further
limitation on parental autonomy59 and increases the level of state
interference in childrearing by granting grandparents visitation rights
that they did not ordinarily possess in the past.' °
II. HISTORY OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
A. Grandparent Visitation Rights at Common Law
Due to the common-law emphasis on parental autonomy, grandpar-
ents traditionally have no right to visit with their grandchildren if the
parents choose to deny them access.61 Judges have enunciated
several reasons for denying grandparents visitation rights. Some
judges have opined that granting grandparents an independent right
resources to govern upbringing of every child in its domain). See generally Kotkin, supra note 37,
at 380-88 (analyzing development of parental autonomy rights).
58. See supra notes 47-56 (discussing harm prerequisite for state intervention).
59. See MichaelJ. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 IND. LJ. 191,
192-93 (1984) (describing visitation privileges as form of limitation placed on custody because
in visitation, custodian has care and control of child even if only for limited period); Rorer,
supra note 3, at 298 (acknowledging that visitation is infringement on parents' custody rights).
60. See MichaelJ. Minerva,Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their
"Bundle ofJoy, " 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 533 (1991) (explaining that grandparent visitation
statutes provide grandparents with rights that they did not previously have absent death of
grandchild's parent or dissolution of parents' marriage).
61. See, e.g., Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1983) (Shores, J., concurring)
(recognizing that common law does not grant grandparent visitation rights), superseded by statute
as stated in Mills v. Parker, 549 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1989); White v.Jacobs, 243 Cal. Rptr.
597, 598 (Ct. App. 1988) (denying grandparent visitation rights at common law); Odell v. Lutz,
177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (conceding that grandparents do not possess
visitation rights under common law); Chodzko v. Chodzko, 360 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ill. 1976) ("The
right to determine the third parties who are to share in the custody and influence of and
participate in the visitation privileges with the children should vest primarilywith the parentwho
is charged with the daily responsibility of rearing the children."); In re Goldfarb, 70 A.2d 94, 96
(NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (holding that grandparents do not have visitation rights under
common law); Shriver v. Shriver, 219 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (disapproving
parents' decision to deny grandparents visitation with grandchild, but conceding that court
cannot create visitation rights for grandparents);Jefferies v.Jefferies, 253 S.E.2d 689, 691 (W.
Va. 1979) (holding that grandparents have no legal right to visitation with grandchildren).
There are four possible rationales for the common-law rule disallowing grandparent visitation:
first, a parent's obligation to allow grandparent visitation is moral, not legal; second, ajudicial
award of visitation would jeopardize parental authority, third, forcing a child into the center of
a conflict between parents and grandparents is contrary to the child's best interests; and finally,
natural ties, not judicial intervention, are the best formula for restoring family accord.
GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 24; see Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear
Family has Failed; 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 881 (1984) ("According to traditional parental rights
doctrine, applied still in many states, the state will not recognize relationships formed by adults
other than the child's legal parents unless the parents are unfit or have abandoned the child.").
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of visitation would undermine parental authority." Other courts
were concerned that an intergenerational conflict would only hurt the
development of the child involved.63 Finally, courts traditionally
have treated parental autonomy as a fundamental value that should
not be impeded by granting grandparent visitation rights.6
Although they lack common-law visitation rights, grandparents do
have nominal constitutional rights regarding their extended family.
The Supreme Court has "accepted an enlarged definition of 'family'
when to do so will nurture and protect established familial and
cultural bonds."65  In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' a zoning
ordinance defined "family" so narrowly that it prevented the appellant
from sharing her home with her son and her two grandsons, who
were first cousins.67 The Supreme Court determined that personal
choices in matters of family definition are protected by the Due
Process Clause, a determination that protects the tradition of the
extended family.6"
The Court further intimated that in certain instances, grandparents
have constitutionally protected family rights.69 The Court in Moore,
however, only discussed situations where the grandparent was already
living with the grandchild. 70  Because grandparents at common law
generally do not have a right to visit with their grandchildren,7' a
due process argument promoting grandparent visitation would
probably fail because a traditionally protected right is not being
asserted.72 Thus, Moore does little to provide grandparents whose
62. Ode!l 177 P.2d at 629 ("'To permit grandparents to intervene would... injuriously
hinder proper parental authority by dividing it.'") (quoting Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152
(La. 1894)).
63. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1952); see also Cox v. Stayton, 619 S.W.2d 617,
621 (Ark. 1981) ("To create new, enforceable rights in grandparents could lead to results that
would burden... the welfare of the child.").
64. Theodore R. v. LorettaJ., 476 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (Fain. Ct. 1984) (denying grandparents'
request for visitation rights and reiterating that "there should not be any judicial interference
with the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent").
65. Kotkin, supra note 37, at 388.
66. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
67. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1977).
68. Id. at 502-04.
69. Id. at 504 ("Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.").
70. Id. at 495-96.
71. See supra note 61 (discussing grandparents' lack of visitation rights at common law).
72. SeeWard v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Del. Faro. Ct. 1987) (holding that grandparent
can claim deprivation of liberty interest "only where the grandparent-grandchild relationship is
essentially a custodial one"); see also Brown, supra note 17, at 143 (asserting that for interest to
be entitled to due process protection, it must be generally recognized as right protected by
Constitution and that grandparent visitation does not fall within this rubric).
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grandchildren have never lived with them with a constitutional right
of visitation.
73
B. Enactment of Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Since 1965, state legislatures, sympathizing with the plight of
grandparents, have enacted grandparent visitation statutes. 74 Not
coincidentally, these statutes secured grandparent visitation rights as
the divorce rate increased and the birth rate declined in America.75
Often when there is a divorce or the death of a parent, relations
among the parent and former in-laws, the child's grandparents,
become strained.76 State legislatures have determined that, in such
instances, multigenerational ties between grandchildren and grandpar-
ents should not suffer because of strained relations between parents
and former in-laws.77 Further, as the American birth rate began to
decline, grandparents had fewer grandchildren and, therefore, had an
increased interest in maintaining contact with those grandchildren
73. Brown, supra note 17, at 142 (reasoning that under Moore, definition of "family"
excludes grandparents unless grandparents are living with grandchild, and that once these living
arrangements change, courts will deny grandparents right to visit with grandchild).
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing grandparent visitation statutes); see also
Exparte Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1983) (Shores,J, concurring) (recommending that
Alabama legislature extend right of visitation to grandparents because "[p]recious little remains
of the family structure, which played such a vital part in the development of this nation. It
seems unconscionable to allow its futher fragmentation."); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632
(Ky.) (enunciating that statutes granting grandparent visitation rights are legislative attempts to
strengthen familial bonds in face of general disintegration of family unit), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
378 (1992).
75. See Fermndez, supra note 18, at 115 (noting that initiation of grandparent visitation
statutes occurred as divorce rate in America tripled); Matthews & Sprey, supra note 4, at 45
(suggesting that expanded kinship systems created by increasing divorce rate and declining birth
rate have compelled grandparents to take legal action to preserve their visitation rights with
grandchildren); supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing how grandparent visitation
statutes were result of changing demographics and increasing divorce rate); see also 1982 House
Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Rep. Biaggi) (describing goal of congressional hearings
as launching national debate on issue of grandparent visitation rights in event of marital
dissolution).
76. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 16 (statement of Mr. and Mrs. Max Chasens,
grandparents) (describing disputes between grandparents and parents). Mr. Chasens noted:
[Some disputes] may be sincere or may be prompted by dislike and distrust between
the generations. For instance, a mother with custody may deny her ex-husband's
parents permission to see their grandchildren because she disapproves of their religion,
their morals or their attitudes. Or she may want revenge for real or imagined insults
by the parents or her former husband.
Id. (quoting Alice Eckerson, Grandparents Fightfor Visiting Rights, An. Cr1Y PRESS, Apr. 13, 1982,
at 10). The strain of divorce may become exacerbated when the custodial parent moves away,
and as a result of unrelated personal feelings, the custodial parent may deny visitation to the
grandparents. This same predicament may also develop when a spouse dies, and the parent
denies the deceased spouse's parents access to the grandchild. Fernindez, supra note 18, at 116.
77. Ferndndez, supra note 18, at 116.
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they did have.78 Grandparent visitation statutes were a response to
these developments and an acknowledgement of the unique and
nostalgic relationship between grandparents and grandchildren.79
Originally, grandparent visitation statutes were enacted to protect
children from the emotional harm of abruptly ending meaningful
grandparent-grandchild relationships during times of family crisis.
80
As time has progressed, many state legislatures have broadened the
scope of grandparent visitation statutes to allow visitation whenever it
would be in "the best interests of the child."" Expanding the scope
of grandparent visitation rights is problematic in a variety of ways.
First, while using "the best interests of the child" as a guide for
granting grandparent visitation is a noble idea, it often fails to achieve
its goal because legislatures fail to define "the best interests of the
child."" Also, because most family law matters, including grandpar-
ent visitation, are left to the discretion of individual states,
grandparents' visitation rights vary considerably from state to state,
raising the problem of inconsistent treatment.8 3
III. RECENT EXPANSION IN GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES
Initially, most grandparent visitation statutes only encompassed
78. See supra note 4 (discussing relationship between declining birth rate and grandparent
visitation disputes).
79. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of unique relationship
between grandparents and grandchildren).
80. See Samuel V. Schoonmaker III et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by Third-Party Access to
Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95, 95-96 (1991) (discussing development of and change in character of
grandparent visitation statutes).
81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103
(Michie 1991); CAL CIrv. CODE § 197.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021
(Baldwin 1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney
1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1993); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(a) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245(4) (West 1993).
82. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing problems with "best interests
of the child" standard).
83. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01 (Harrison Supp. 1992) (providing that grandparents
may petition for visitation privileges when: (1) one or both parents of child are deceased, (2)
parents are divorced, or (3) one or both parents have deserted child) with KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 405.021 (Baldwin 1991) ("The circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the
paternal or maternal grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the
decree if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so."). The Florida statute
is the most common type, limiting grandparent visitation to cases of divorce, death, or
abandonment by one of the child's parents. See Rorer, supra note 3, at 298 (contending that
majority of grandparent visitation statutes require "disruptive precipitating event"). The
Kentucky statute, on the other hand, typifies a broader grant of grandparent visitation rights,
as it is loosely written and can be interpreted to allow grandparent visitation rights even when
the child's family is intact. See generally Shandling, supra note 5, at 119-21 (noting lack of
uniformity among grandparent visitation statutes); supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing variation among grandparent visitation statutes).
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family situations complicated by the death, separation, or divorce of
the parents.8 4 Today, grandparent visitation statutes are expanding
beyond their original limited scope.' The two most controversial
issues in this area are whether grandparents should have the right to
visit grandchildren in an intact family and whether grandparents
should have the right to visit with grandchildren who have been
adopted.'
A. Grandparent Visitation Statutes and the Intact Family
In some states, grandparent visitation laws limit visitation to
nonintacte7 or disrupted families.' Several state statutes, however,
are broadly written and could be interpreted to permit grandparents
to visit with grandchildren in an intact family.89 This potential
84. See Brown, supra note 17, at 133; Femrndez, supra note 18, at 128 & n.81.
85. See Bums, supra note 7, at 60 (noting trend among state legislatures to expand
grandparent visitation rights); see also supra note 8 (citing proposed amendments to state
grandparent visitation statutes).
86. SeeAmy D. Marcus, Grandparents Seek Their Rights in Cour4 WALL ST.J.,June 5, 1991, at
B6 (reporting that while majority of grandparent visitation cases involve disrupted or broken
families, increasing percentage of cases regard intact families); see also GRANDPARENT VISITATION
MANUAL, supra note 7, at 34 (reporting that grandparent visitation in intact family is among most
controversial situations).
87. For purposes of this Comment, a nonintact family refers to a family that has endured
a disruptive event such as death, separation, or divorce.
88. See, e.g., AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (A) (1)-(2) (Supp. 1993) (providing courtwith
discretion to grant visitation rights to grandparents if "marriage of parents . . . has been
dissolved for at least three months ... [or if a] parent.., has been deceased or missing for at
least three months"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(a) (1) (Michie 1991) (allowing petition for
grandparent visitation "if the marital relationship between the parents of the child has been
severed by death, divorce, or legal separation"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 9-102 (1991)
(permitting grandparent visitation petition "[a]t any time after the termination of a marriage
by divorce, annulment, or death"); see also Towne v. Cole, 478 N.E.2d 895, 900 (Il1. App. Ct.
1985) (finding no visitation right where family has not experienced death or divorce); In re
Meek, 443 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no cause of action for visitation where
parent is deceased or remains married); McCarty v. McCarty, 559 So. 2d 517, 517-18 (La. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that grandparent has no right to visitation where child's family is intact);
Thompson v. Vanaman, 515 A.2d 1254, 1255-56 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (finding that
there must be disruption in child's family for grandparent to have cause of action); Herron v.
Seizak, 468 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (noting that court cannot interfere with intact
family); Theodore R v. Loretta J., 476 N.Y.S.2d 720, 720-21 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (denying
grandparent right to visitation in intact family absent extenuating circumstances that would
justify intervention); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 581-82 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that granting
grandparent visitation rights when family is intact violates privacy interest of parents in child-
rearing under Tennessee state constitution). But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1) (B)
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (broadening, for first time, grandparent visitation rights and allowing
grandparents to petition for visitation without requiring marriage dissolution or death of
parent). The Illinois statute was amended again in 1990 to ban grandparent interference in
intact families. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/607(b) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4(c) (1989) (providing that "[a]t the discretion of the court,
visitation rights for grandparents... shall be granted... [if a] grandparent is unreasonably
denied visitation.., for a period exceeding 90 days"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West
1986) (noting that "[tihe superior court may grant the right of visitation ... to any person..
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expansion of grandparent visitation rights into the intact family
jeopardizes parental autonomy by subjecting intact functioning
parents to unwarranted state interference.' Recently, Kentucky's
broadly written grandparent visitation statute was at issue in King v.
King.91 In King, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a Kentucky
Supreme Court decision that interpreted the Kentucky grandparent
visitation statute" to allow a child's paternal grandfather to visit with
the child twice weekly against the wishes of the child's married, fit,
and natural parents. 3 The Court's decision not to hear this case
and, thus, to allow the Kentucky statute to stand as constitutional, has
been hailed as a major advancement in grandparent visitation
rights94 because it recognizes grandparents' rights to visit with
grandchildren in intact nuclear families.95
The intriguing aspect of the King decision is that it allows the
visitation rights of grandparents to impinge upon parental autonomy.
The King decision permits grandparent visitation even when the
child's parents are fit and happily married, but for one reason or
. [and] shall be according to the court's bestjudgment... and subject to such conditions and
limitations as deems equitable"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991) (providing that
"[tihe circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to . . . grandparents . . . if it
determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so").
90. See Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987) (acknowledging valid
reasons for not subjecting intact families to grandparent visitation laws). The court noted:
[P]arents, natural or adoptive, living together as husband and wife are more likely to
make decisions regarding with whom their children associate in a manner that protects
their children's best interests. Personal animosity towards the other parent and his or
her family is less likely to color this visitation decision. Furthermore, parents living
together are equally informed regarding the children's needs and desires.
91. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992).
92. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991).
93. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632-33 (Ky.) (finding that there is no reason to permit
"trivial disagreement between a father and son" to deprive grandchild and grandparent from
developing natural bond), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992). But see id. at 633 (Lambert, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that evidence supports parents contention that grandfather "is an
overbearing individual who intruded with impunity upon respondents' family life demonstrating
total indifference to their wishes"). Mr. King petitioned the court for the right to visit with his
granddaughter after her parents denied him permission to visit with her. Id. at 631. Mr. King
had almost daily contact with the child for sixteen months while she and her parents lived and
worked on Mr. King's tobacco farm. Id. at 630. When relations between the grandfather and
the child's parents deteriorated, the parents moved off the farm and did not allow Mr. King to
visit with their child. Id. at 630-31. Accordingly, Mr. King filed a petition for visitation rights.
Id. The King decision supports grandparents' position that they should have equal rights to
visitation, regardless of the status of the grandchild's parents. See infra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text (discussing policy arguments in support of absolute right to grandparent
visitation).
94. Bob Dart, Grandparents' Rights Upheld in Court Ruling HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1992, at
A27, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap File (reporting that contrary decision by Supreme
Court in Kingwould have jeopardized grandparent visitation rights throughout country).
95. Id.
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another, do not want their child to associate with the grandparents.96
The Kentucky statute at issue in King is so broad that its scope is
limited only by a nebulous test of what the court believes is in the
child's best interests.9 7  The broad scope of the statute creates
serious conflicts with parents' rights to raise their child without state
interference," and fails to appreciate the potentially detrimental
effect that such visitations over parental objections may have on a
child.' The high value traditionally placed upon parental autonomy
in American society0 makes this expansive grant of rights to
96. See King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (justifying grant of visitation rights to grandfather against
wishes of happily married, fit parents because "a petty dispute between a father and son should
[not] be allowed to deprive a grandparent and grandchild of the unique relationship that
ordinarily exists between those individuals").
97. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1991).
98. See supra notes 35-60 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional analysis of
parental rights).
99. See Commonwealth ex reL Zaffarano v. Genaro, 455 A.2d 1180, 1181-82 (Pa. 1983)
(refusing grandparents' request for unsupervised visitation with child because hard feelings
existing between father and grandparents would place child in crossfire between adults); Com-
monwealth ex reL Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943) (denying grandparents
visitation rights or custody because visitations, intra-family quarrels, and legal proceeding were
causing child to suffer from nervousness and stomach problems). The Flannery court
determined:
[T]he health and welfare of a child must not be shattered in the crossfire of
supposedly conflicting legal rights as to its custody. Despite the fact that grandparents
may have become so deeply attached to a child that it will be a real hardship to be
deprived of his society, sympathy for them cannot be permitted to interfere with the
best interest and future welfare of the child.
F/anneiy, 30 A.2d at 812; see also Brown, supra note 17, at 134 (noting that Illinois General
Assembly restricted previously liberal grandparent visitation statute and suggesting that because
of intrusion on parental autonomy and stress on child due to court-imposed visitations, this
decision was correct one); Sharon F. Ladd, Note, Tennessee Statutory Visitation Rights of
Grandparents and the Best Interests of the Child 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 635, 652-54 (1985) (arguing
that "[i]f the natural parents have a viable marriage, it is not wise to allow parents of either
parent to bring suit as this could have a devastating effect on the marriage and therefore the
child"); see also Cox v. Stayton, 619 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Ark. 1981) (disallowing grandparents
visitation rights in intact family because such rights were not expressly provided for in statute
and noting that despite genuine relational link between grandchildren and grandparents, "the
sanctity of the relationship between the parent and the child must be the overriding concern").
In Cox, the court noted that "[to create new, enforceable rights in grandparents could lead to
results that would burden rather than enhance the welfare of children." Cox, 619 S.W.2d at 621.
100. See supra notes 35-36 (citing cases affirming parental autonomy at common law); see also
White v. Jacobs, 243 Cal. Rptr. 597, 597-98 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to allow grandparents to
visit with grandchild against wishes of child's parents and noting that hostility between child's
parents and grandparents resulted in emotionally traumatic visitations for child). The court
further noted that even when grandparent visitation is provided for by statute, there is a
presumption against allowing such privileges if the parent's object to the visitation. Id. at 598;
see also Moore v. Moore, 365 S.E.2d 662, 663 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (ruling against allowing
grandparent visitation in intact family because fundamental rights of parental autonomy
preclude grant of visitation rights to grandparents), superseded ly statute as stated in Ray v. Ray,
407 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). One commentator, questioning the soundness of
subjecting parental decisionmaking to court judgment, asked:
Should we be subjecting mutual parental decisions made in a whole marriage to
adjudication? Can the courts stand in the position of the parents well enough to
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grandparents highly unusual.
This extraordinary grant of visitation rights to grandparents
generally fails to consider the best interests of the child,1"' relying
instead on traditional and emotional conceptions of the family."0 2
The In re La Russo '0 decision exhibits this reliance on traditional
notions of family life. In La Russo, a married couple prevented
paternal grandparents from visiting their grandchildren for several
years. 114  This hindrance was the result of a longstanding dispute
between the child's father and grandfather regarding the
grandfather's preferential treatment of the father's sister and the
father's allegation that his mother physically abused him."5 The
court overcame this family dissension, and decided that "[t] he mere
fact that the parents and grandparents have had a falling out and that
animosity exists between them should not preclude visitation if the
court finds that visitation would be in the best interest of the
children." ' 6  The court in La Russo apparently clings to the
nostalgic concept of an extended family in which there are differences
of opinion, but whose members are joined together by the common
bond of family unity.' Allegations of physical abuse and court-
room battles, however, do not comport with this nostalgic notion of
the family. It is difficult to comprehend how legally imposed
visitation with the grandparents in this situation could be in the
child's best interest when the visitation places the child in the middle
of an emotional minefield. Such visitation rights are especially
troublesome when, in situations like La Russo, the child has not had
contact with the grandparents and does not have a close, psychologi-
cally beneficial relationship with them.
decide whether the parental judgment is or is not reasonable? Is it in "the best
interests of the child" per se to question parental decisions in the whole marriage, and
to weaken parental authority? Access to courts establishes a certain kind of power.
Will the threat of adjudication influence reasonable parental decisions adversely?
Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Hearings on S. Con. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Senate
Hearings] (statement of John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
101. See Brown, supra note 17, at 147 (arguing that because best interests of child standard
is poorly defined in many state statutes, judges have discretion to impose their personal views
and concerns regarding family structure when considering child's best interests).
102. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 137-38 (noting that Illinois legislature's debates on
whether to expand grandparent visitation rights focused on emotion and traditional conceptions
of family).
103. 9 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2646 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Aug. 10, 1983).
104. In re La Russo, 9 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2646, 2647 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Aug. 10, 1983).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2648.
107. See id. (noting that grandparents had made sincere effort to see grandchildren, had
attended school functions, and had sent gifts).
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Recently, in Hawk v. Hawk,1" 8 the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed grandparent visitation rights in an intact family and
concluded that imposing the court's opinion of what is in the best
interests of the child over the parents' objections is an unjustified
intrusion into the "protected sphere of family life.""° Instead, the
court held that when the family is intact there must be a finding of
substantial harm to the child, and then the court may levy its own
subjective opinions of what the best interests of the child de-
mands."' By employing this careful two-step analysis, the court
sought to avoid the pitfall of assuming grandparent-grandchild
visitation is always beneficial and to respect parental autonomy."'
1. Arguments in favor of grandparent visitation rights in an intact
family
The arguments that grandparents voice in response to attempts to
limit visitation rights to nonintact families are twofold. First, limiting
grandparent visitation rights to nonintact families constitutes disparate
treatment of grandparents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.!12  For example, some grandparents may be
able to petition for visitation if the grandchild's parents are divorced
or if some other event has disrupted the intact family, while other
grandparents cannot petition for visitation solely because the
grandchild's parents have a solid marriage and the family is intact.
Grandparents argue that the status of the grandchild's parents should
not affect the grandparents' right to visit with their grandchild."'
The second argument that grandparents proffer involves a two-step
analysis. First, they maintain that the childrearing practices of all
parents should be liberated from state interference and that this right
does not apply solely to parents in an intact family."4  Typically,
108. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
109. Id. at 577.
110. Id. at 579.
111. Id. at 581.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . .. deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); seeWard v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063, 1069-70 (Del.
Fain. Ct. 1987) (noting petitioner's argument that this differing treatment of grandparents is
"an arbitrary and invidious discrimination against one group of grandparents" but holding that
state had "valid reasons" for decision and treatment was not equal protection violation).
113. See Brown, supra note 17, at 144-45 (discussing grandparents'equal protection argument
in favor of visitation).
114. Frances E. v. Peter E., 479 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Fain. Ct. 1984). The counter argument
that parents proffer is that grandparents have a derivative right to visitation based on the right
of the deceased or noncustodial parent. Id. Because neither parent in the intact family wants
the grandparent to be allowed visitation rights, parents contend that the grandparent does not
have a derivative right to visitation. Id.
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grandparent visitation statutes only grant visitation upon an event
which is disruptive to family unity."' When the court or the
legislature contends that parents who have experienced a disruptive
event, such as a divorce, separation, or death, are susceptible to
greater state interference through statute-created grandparent
visitation rights, the state is making an inappropriate and overinclusive
judgment about the parents' ability to raise their children adequate-
ly." 6 In the final step of the analysis, grandparents argue that all
states should treat intact and nonintact families equally and should
permit all grandparents to petition for visitation rights.
2. Previous contact and grandparent visitation in the intact family
In granting grandparent visitation rights when the nuclear family
is intact, state legislatures have not consistently or thoroughly
addressed the time that the grandchild may have spent living in daily
contact with the grandparent and how that should affect a court's
decision to allow grandparent visitation rights in an intact family."'
New York's highest court recently addressed this issue in In re Emanuel
S. v. Joseph E.," 8 ruling that grandparents have standing to petition
for visitation with their grandchildren in an intact family if they either
have previously formed a relationship with the grandchildren, or have
made a sincere effort to establish a relationship with the grandchil-
dren but were rebuffed by the children's parents."9 Similarly, in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,20 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when grandparents have lived with a grandchild for a significant
period of time before estrangement, the grandparents may have some
rights to continued contact with the child.1
2 1
Courts generally agree that the goal of grandparent rights
115. See GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 8-9 (noting that most
grandparent visitation statutes only intervene after divorce or death of parent).
116. See Frances E., 479 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The grandparents argued:
This right to be free from state interference... inures to all parents and should have
no greater application to parents who are married and residing together in an "intact
family." To assert that, as a matter of law, a widowed, divorced, remarried, or
unmarried parent is subject to greater state interference than a married parent would
be to assert that the former is less fit than the latter to raise his or her own child.
Id.
117. GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 32 (noting that few state statutes
provide specific guidelines for determining whether grandparent visitation should be permitted
when grandchild has spent time living with grandparent). In Minnesota, the state legislature
has determined that where a minor has lived with the grandparent for at least one year, the
grandparent may petition for visitation privileges. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992).
118. 577 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
119. In reEmanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 27 (N.Y. 1991).
120. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
121. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977).
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legislation is to maintain already existing vital relationships between
grandparents and grandchildren, not to forge new relationships.
122
For example, when the grandparents have provided daily care for the
child for a significant period of time, 121 the grandparents may argue
that they have served as a "psychological parent"1 24 to the child and
disruption of this relationship would be psychologically unsettling for
the child."z  It is valid to distinguish grandparents' psychological
relationship with the child from their biological relationship because
granting grandparent visitation rights based solely on their biological
relationship with the child bases the right of visitation on the
grandparents' best interests instead of on the child's best inter-
ests. 
26
B. Grandparent Visitation Statutes and Adoption
Courts have held that when a child is adopted, all previous ties with
the child's natural family are abolished.127  State legislatures also
122. See Apker v. Machak, 490 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (App. Div. 1985) (denying grandparents
visitation rights because they had not seen grandchildren in nine years and thus lacked any
meaningful relationship with their grandchildren); Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487,488 (Old.
App. 1978) ("Visitation is not solely for the benefit of the adult visitor but is aimed at fulfilling
what many conceive to be a vital, or at least a wholesome contribution to the child's emotional
well-being by permitting partial continuation of an earlier established close relationship."); 1982
House Hearing, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Dr. Andre Derdeyn, Director, University of
Virginia Child and Family Psychiatry Training Program) ("Whether grandparent visitation is
awarded or not depends on the court's assessment of the value of continuing the child's
relationship with the grandparent weighed against the amount of disruption to the child's
immediate family unit and the amount of animosity the various adults hold for each other.").
123. See, e.g., Kingv. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Ky.) (noting that for 16 months while family
lived on his farm grandfather had almost daily contact with child), cert. denie, 113 S. Ct. 378
(1992); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Tenn. 1993) (discussing previously frequent
contact between grandparents and child in intact family, including weekly overnight visits).
124. SeeJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 98 (1979)
(defining "psychological parent" as "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for
a parent, as well as the child's physical needs" and noting that "[t]he psychological parent may
be a biological... parent ... or any other person").
125. See Derdeyn, supra note 7, at 278 (contending that "[i]f decisions were truly guided by
the principle of maintaining relationships with psychological parents," grandchild would remain
with grandparent to maintain established psychological relationship). But see Thompson et al.,
supra note 1, at 1220 (commenting that although concept of "psychological parent" has been
valuable construct in study of child development, institutionalizing such concept may foster
changes in family functioning).
126. See Barbara S. Hughes, The Effect of C.G.F. and Section 48.925 on Grandparental Visitation
Petitions, WISc. LAw., Nov. 1992, at 13, 14 (questioning "whether the proliferation of statutes
granting third-party rights to visitation-based upon the third-party's interests rather than the
child's relationship with that party or the parents constitutionally protected rights-is truly the
best interest of the children and families involved").
127. SeeExparteBronstein, 434 So. 2d 780,781-82 (Ala. 1983) (noting that in adoption, state
employs patens patriae authority to create status that severs all rights of natural parents),
superseded by statute as stated in Mills v. Parker, 549 So. 2d 97 (Ala. CL App. 1989); Hill v. Garner,
561 S.W.2d 106, 107-08 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that termination of parental rights
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:563
have determined that adoption statutes should supersede visitation
statutes.1 28  As a practical matter, this abdication of rights by the
natural family is not greatly contested when the child is placed for
adoption as an infant.129  With the advent of increased stepchild
adoption and adoption of older children, automatic termination of
natural family rights sometimes seems counter to the best interests of
the child. 30 As a result, some states have created an exception to
the rule of automatic termination of rights upon adoption.
1 3 1
pursuant to statute permanently severs relationship of parent and child); Bowling v. Bowling,
631 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tenn. 1982) (determining that adoption of child by maternal
grandparents would sever prior legal relationships and end court-ordered visitation rights in
paternal grandparents); see also In re Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1980) (advancing two
policy reasons for denying grandparent's rights upon adoption: (1) grandparent visitation
against wishes of adoptive parents would never be in "best interests of the child;" and (2)
grandparents' visitation rights are derivative of parents' rights and, thus, when parents' rights
are terminated, grandparent rights are also terminated), superseded by statute as stated in In reA.C.,
428 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 1988);Jouett v. Rhorer, 339 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1960) (noting "public
policy demands that an adoption shall carry with it a complete breaking off of old ties").
128. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01(d) (1993) ("All visitation rights granted
under this section automatically terminate if the child has been adopted or placed for
adoption."); CAL CIV. CODE § 197.5 (c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) ("Any visitation rights granted
pursuant to this section prior to the adoption of the child shall be automatically terminated
upon such adoption."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(3) (West 1992) ("Any visitation rights
granted pursuant to this section prior to the adoption of the child shall be automatically
terminated upon such adoption."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (b) (1991) ("This section shall
not apply if the child has been adopted by a person other than a stepparent. Any visitation
rights granted pursuant to this section prior to the adoption shall be automatically terminated
upon such adoption."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1016 (1989) ("When a child subject to an order
under this chapter is later adopted, the order under this chapter expires except when the
adopting parent is a stepparent, grandparent or other relative of the child."); see also Wilson v.
Wallace, 622 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Ark. 1981) (holding that adoption severs all ties between child
and natural relatives); Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Ky. 1989) (dismissing grandparents'
claim of visitation rights when child's parents were killed in auto accident and child was adopted
by cousin); Smith v. Trosclair, 303 So. 2d 926, 927 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (determining that
adoption legally severed relationship between child and natural grandmother), aftd 321 So. 2d
514 (La. 1975); Appeals Court Rules in Visitation Case UPI, Dec. 17,1992, available inLEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File (discussing ruling that Ohio courts have no authority to grant grandparents
visitation rights after child has been adopted).
129. See Fernindez, supra note 18, at 119 (noting that in past, many children placed for
adoption at infancy were illegitimate, and because of young age of children, terminating ties to
natural families was logical).
130. See Nathan, supra note 18, at 635-36 (indicating that because older children are more
likely to have meaningful relationships with natural family members, automatic termination of
all visitation rights may be traumatic for child and may clash with child's best interests). But cf
Hood v. Connaughton, 426 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that grant of rights to
grandparents to visit deceased daughter's children was overextensive where visits would hinder
children's adjustment to new family); Theimer, supra note 7, at A4 (noting that mother thought
her child's visits with paternal grandparents after adoption of child by stepfather would be
confusing to child).
131. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01(D) (Supp. 1993) (providing that automatic
termination of visitation rights provisions do not apply "[ilf the child is removed from an
adoptive placement" or if child adopted "by the spouse of a natural parent if the natural parent
remarries"); MWNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(3) (West 1992) (eliminating automatic termination
where child is adopted by relative or stepparent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (a) (1991)
(eliminating automatic termination where child is adopted by relative or stepparent); see also
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In H.E v. TE,'32 the Supreme Court denied certiorari and
thereby upheld the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that broadly
interpreted grandparent visitation rights in the realm of stepparent
adoption. 3 This case involved paternal grandparents who wanted
the right to visit their deceased son's child."M The child's mother,
upon her remarriage and the child's adoption by the stepfather,
denied visitation to the grandparents."3 5 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed the grandparents continued visitation rights despite
adoption by the stepparent.136  The court contrasted the situation
in H.E with the rights of grandparents to visit the child of a living son
who terminated his parental rights. 3 7 In H.E, the child's father
remained the child's parent despite his death.3 8 As the father had
not voluntarily relinquished his rights, the grandparents' right to
visitation likewise had not been relinquished.19  Thus, H.E takes a
step toward recognizing that grandparents' right of visitation with
grandchildren is not exclusively tied to the presence of the par-
ents.
140
In H., the court addressed grandparent visitation rights in the
Johnson v. Fallon, 181 Cal. Rptr. 414, 418-19 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that in all adoptive
situations, court is to weigh dual considerations of whether granting grandparent visitation is in
child's best interests and, if so, whether grant of grandparent visitation would unduly impede
adoptive relationship); Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 71-73 (Ky. 1989) (allowing stepparent
adoptions as sole exception to Kentucky statute terminating all connections with adopted child's
natural family); People exreL Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1051-52 (N.Y. 1981) (holding
that extinguishing grandparent visitation rights after adoption is overbroad reading of statute's
termination provision and would disrupt court's obligation to protect child's best interests, and
indicating that state had created adoptive relationship through statute and, therefore, should
be able to determine extent of contact child should have with natural family); infra notes 133-47
and accompanying text (discussing move away from traditional termination of rights upon
adoption).
For examples of statutes that do not provide for automatic termination, see ALA. CODE § 30-3-
4 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (Supp. 1993); N.Y. DOM. REI LAW § 72 (McKinney 1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
132. 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wisc.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
135. See H.F. v. T.F., 483 N.W.2d 808, 804-06 (Wisc.) (finding that deceased father continues
to be parent and that, accordingly, grandparents' rights are not terminated upon child's
subsequent adoption), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992).
134. Id. at 804.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 805-06 (noting Wisconsin Legislature's intent to maintain grandparent-
grandchild relationships after adoption).
137. Id. at 805 (comparing H.F. with Soergel v. Raufnan, 453 N.W.2d 624 (Wisc. 1990)).
In Soerge, the father severed all of his rights to his minor child. Soerge, 453 N.W.2d at 624. The
court in H.F found that the circumstances in H.F. were qualitatively different than those in
Soerge, where the father voluntarily abandoned his rights to his child. H.F., 483 N.W.2d at 805.
138. H.F., 483 N.W.2d at 805.
139. Id. at 805-06.
140. See Nathan, supra note 18, at 647 (noting that termination of grandparent visitation
rights upon adoption of grandchild unfairly penalizes grandparents, who did not cause adoption
or desire to terminate relationship with child).
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specific context of adoption by a stepparent. 4' This decision does
not provide guidance on more complicated adoption situations, such
as adoption by someone other than a stepparent 4 2 or adoption
when the other natural parent is still living and agrees to the
adoption" and to the denial of the grandparents' visitation rights.
In these instances, whether grandparents can petition for visitation
depends on what the court perceives to be the basis for granting
grandparent visitation rights. Two theories form the basis for
granting grandparent visitation. First, the derivative rights theory
bases grandparents' right to visitation as a derivative of the parents'
legal relationship with the child.144 The second more commonly
accepted theory bases grandparent visitation on the statutory right
which focuses on the grandparents past relationship with the
child.145 As the law has evolved and attempted to focus on the best
interests of the child, grandparents' right to visitation has been
increasingly based on the grandparents' prior relationship with the
child and not on the grandparents' derivative right. 46 With domes-
tic relations becoming more complex and adoption and grandparent
visitation statutes developing in conflict, courts and legislatures can no
longer adhere to the simplistic notion that all of a child's ties with his
141. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Ky. 1989) (denying grandparents visitation
rights to child adopted by cousin after accidental death of child's parents). In Lingwall v.
Hoener, 483 N.E.2d 512, 512 (Ill. 1985), the Illinois Supreme Court wrote thoughtfully about
the various interests at stake where grandparent visitation arises in the context of adoption:
Absent an adoption of an infant by strangers, there is no reason to assume from the
outset that termination of a grandparental relationship is in an adopted child's best
interest; nor is there any reason to view grandparental visitation as an "unnecessary
intrusion" in the lives of a reconstituted family. Of course the child's best interest is
not entirely severable from the interests of the parents in a reconstituted family, and
certainly the parents' attitude toward grandparental visitation is an important factor for
the courts to consider in determining whether such visitation should be ordered.
However, their attitude is not the only, or even the paramount, consideration. Such
factors as the length and quality of the relationship between grandparents and child,
the child's need for continuity in his relationships with people who may have played
a significant nurturing role in his life, and the effect of the termination of the child's
relationship with the parent who has relinquished his rights and responsibilities must
also be considered. These factors will certainly outweigh the opposition of parents that
is based on the mere inconvenience to them of such visits, or on their animosity
toward the child's other natural parent.
Id. at 516-17.
143. See, e.g., Soergelv. Raufman, 453 N.W.2d 624,627-28 (Wisc. 1990) (concerning adoption
of child while natural father is alive and natural father relinquishes all rights and responsibilities
regarding child).
144. See Ferndndez, supra note 18, at 118-22.
145. The second theory is the more commonly accepted view and provides that visitation is
a statutory right rather than a biological one. See Cox v. Stayton, 619 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Ark.
1981); In re Meek, 443 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
146. See Fern.ndez, supra note 18, at 118-22. But see Rudolph v. Floyd, 832 S.W.2d 219, 220
(Ark. 1992) (noting that grandparent rights are derivative of their child's parental rights).
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or her natural family cease upon adoption. 1
47
IV. THE FUTURE OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
As the American family continues to evolve and change in form,
stepparents, extended family, and caretakers will wish to obtain rights
to visit with the child.148  To accommodate the new needs of the
American family, the law too must change. Lawmakers must
approach this change in policy carefully because family law both
"define [s] and institutionalize [s] family structure and roles."'4
Legislatures have initiated a change in family law policy through the
enactment of grandparent visitation statutes. The variation among
these statutes, and the lack of guidance from Congress or the
Supreme Court, however, has created difficulties for both parents and
grandparents in determining their respective rights regarding the
children. These inconsistencies and ambiguities have created
147. In Lingwall v. Hoener, 483 N.E.2d 512, 516 (Ill. 1985) the court noted:
Different issues are involved in determining the best interest of the child in an
adoption by strangers and in an adoption by a natural parent and a new spouse. In
adoptions involving strangers, the primary policy concern has traditionally been with
maximizing the pool of potential adoptive parents by guaranteeing, through the
termination of the rights and responsibilities of the natural parents, that the adoptive
parents will have "the opportunity to create a stable family relationship free from
unnecessary intrusion .... "
In adoptions by a natural parent and that parent's new spouse, the policy concern
with maximizing the pool of adoptive parents is greatly diminished, since the act of
becoming a stepparent most often occurs without regard to adoption and in spite of
regular visitations between the child and the noncustodial natural parent.
Id.
148. The expansion of those who wish to obtain child visitation rights has already begun and
is being addressed by legislatures. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1991) (providing visitation
for "a grandparent or other person if that is in the best interests of the child"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 461>59 (West 1986) (allowing visitation with child to "any person" whom the court
deems appropriate); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/607(b) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing
visitation privileges to "grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling of any minor child"); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (West Supp. 1993) (awarding "reasonable rights ofcontactwith
a minor child to any [third] persons"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993) (granting
.grandparents, stepparents or other family members" visitation with children); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.240 (Supp. 1992) (providing visitation rights "for a person other than a parent
when visitation may serve the best interest of the child"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(4) (West
1993) (allowing petition for visitation from "grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or
person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child");
see also Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 35-36 (Ky. 1979) (allowing stepparent to have full
hearing to establish whether she should have visitation privileges with stepchild whom she cared
for since child was 17 months old and suggesting that visitation may be in order). But see
Hendershot v. Hendershot, 785 S.W.2d 34, 35-36 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting great-aunt's
petition for visitation with child and refusing to extend grandparent visitation rights to great-
aunt).
149. Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1217 (noting that poorly conceived legal intervention
can provide greater problems than no policy at all); see also Derdeyn, supra note 7, at 282
(noting that unlike other areas of family law, which codify social change, grandparent visitation
legislation is creating changes in family structure and operation).
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particular hardships for the children caught in a family tug-of-war.
Although the courtroom is not the ideal foram to resolve family
disputes,5 ' it has become the last resort for the settlement of
grandparent visitation disputes. To address this problem, state
legislatures must develop and enact a more consistent set of visitation
laws.' Thus, all the states and the District of Columbia need to
work together to construct and adopt a model grandparent visitation
statute.
5 2
Although many grandparents and their supporters suggest that a
federally mandated statute would create uniform grandparent
150. See, e.g., 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 14 (statement ofJohn H. Pickering, Chair,
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American Bar Association) (commenting that
intrafamily conflicts are "emotionally wrenching; litigating them may intensify the emotions and
create great problems for the grandchildren at issue"); 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 100, at
5 (statement ofJohn M. McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws) (commenting that courts of law are poorly equipped to adjudicate
current domestic relations issues and questioning whether it is prudent to add grandparent
rights cases to already overloaded court dockets); 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 16
(statement of Mr. and Mrs. Max Chasens, grandparents) ("Pity the poor judge . . . who
Solomon-like, must carve up a child's time between warring factions that have difficulty passing
a civil word between them. The best solution ... is one worked out not by the judge, but by
the litigants.") (quoting Alice Eckerson, Grandparents Fght for Visiting ights, ATL CITY PRESS,
Apr. 13, 1982, at 10); see also 1991 House Hearing; supra, at 3 (statement of Pat Slorah, grandpar-
ent) (commenting that judicial resolution of grandparent visitation disputes has replaced role
traditionally fulfilled by religious leader, older family member, or leader of community);
GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 124, at 117. Goldstein et al. write:
We reasoned, always from the child's point of view, that custodial parents, not courts
or noncustodial parents should retain the right to determine when and if it is desirable
to arrange visits. We took... this position because it is beyond the capacity of courts
to help a child to forge or maintain positive relationships to two people who are at
cross-purposes with each other because, by forcing visits, courts are more likely to
prevent the child from developing a reliable tie to either parent [or grandparents];
and because children who are shaken, disoriented, and confused by the breakup of
their family need an opportunity to settle down in the privacy of their reorganized
family with one person in authority upon whom they can rely for answers to their
questions and for protection from external interference.
GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 124, at 117.
151. Dr. Andre Derdeyn discussed one problem with setting firm regulations regarding
grandparent visitation statutes in 1982 House Hearing; supra note 1, at 72, where he noted:
[E]stablishing legislation will not adequately solve [this] problem[] [of grandparent
visitation rights] ... in this area, and the area of family law as a whole, I see too many
instances where today's solution becomes tomorrow's problem .... I do not think that
the major solution is going to come out of the legal system. I do not see how it can.
These are not legal issues.
Id.
152. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 76-77 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine,
Georgetown University Medical Center) (commenting that uniform model statutes have been
used successfully in other areas of family law). Professor Areen also noted that while only seven
states had adopted the Uniform Model Divorce Act (UMDA), "[iut has been more influential
than this number suggests... for it has been a source of both policy and language for many
state legislatures." Id. at 83.
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visitation rights, that option is impossible under the Constitution.15
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution enumerates the areas in which
Congress may legislate.'54 Family matters and grandparent visitation
do not fall within any of Congress' enumerated powers. Under the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, all powers not explicitly
delegated to Congress are reserved to the States; 155 thus, grandpar-
ent visitation is in the domain of state control.
While a model statute seems ideal in theory, it is a difficult
proposition to implement because Congress only has two indirect
avenues available to encourage such changes. These options include
preconditioning the receipt of federal funds on the adoption of a
uniform grandparent visitation statute or establishing a resolution on
the subject to encourage states to create a uniform statute. 56
Preconditioning the receipt of federal funding on compliance with
certain federal standards cannot succeed in the realm of grandparent
visitation. Currently, there is no federally funded program relating to
visitation laws, and, thus, no nexus exists between federal funds and
grandparent visitation. 57 Congress' attempt at the second indirect
approach, a nonbinding congressional resolution, has met with little
success. 1
58
153. 1982 House Hearing supra note 1, at 76-77 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine,
Georgetown University Medical Center). Professor Areen noted:
On the one hand, both the variation in, and relatively recent date of, State legislative
protection for grandparent visitation suggest it would be easier if we had a single,
national standard. On the other hand, child custody matters have traditionally been
left to the States. The one Federal statute that touches this area was explicitly intended
to avoid inconsistent decisions by the courts of two or more States involving the
custody of one child. The lack of Federal standards governing custody decisions
reflects an important constitutional constraint: even if Congress wanted to act, it does
not appear to have the constitutional authority to mandate standards for child custody
or visitation.
Id.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
156. 1991 House Hearing supra note 3, at 200-03 (citing GINA M. STEPHENS & GLORIA SUGARS,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: LEGAL OVERVIEW OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS 14-17 (1991)
[hereinafter CRS REPORT] (discussing fact that Congress does not have authority to legislate on
family law questions, and that accordingly, it must use indirect approaches such as nonbinding
resolutions and conditioning of federal funds on compliance to affect such questions).
157. CRS REPORT, supra note 156, at 16 (discussing fact that Congress does not have
preconditioning federal funding available in area of grandparent visitation because there is no
federal program relating to visitation to which to link funds). Additionally, if substantial federal
funds were preconditioned to the adoption of a model grandparent visitation statute, it might
violate the Constitution by encroaching upon the states' rights under the Tenth Amendment
to legislate on non-enumerated topics. Id.
158. See S. Con. Res. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (enacted); see also CRS REPORT, supra
note 156, at 14-15 (discussing feasibility of nonbinding congressional resolutions in family law).
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The uniformity a model statute would provide is necessary to ensure
just enforcement of visitation rights. Currently, when a court grants
grandparents a right of visitation, that right is enforceable only in the
state in which it is granted. If the child's family moves to another
state, the grandparent may have to file a new lawsuit to obtain
visitation. A model statute with a uniform enforcement provision
would eliminate this problem.
In formulating a model statute, the states must draft the provisions
to benefit the child.159  Although it may be beneficial for older
generations to have contact with their grandchildren, the states
should not use the statute to give "the aged their moral rights."'
6°
This Comment suggests that visitation is a state-conferred privilege,
not an absolute right. 6' For this reason, a model statute should
hold the best interests of the child paramount.'62 Thus, the statute
should provide a procedural vehicle through which a grandparent can
apply to a court for visitation rights.'63 The court should then apply
a statutorily defined test to determine whether visitation"6 with the
159. See Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1220 (contending that assessment of whether
visitation is in child's best interests often depends more on intuitive judgments of grandparents'
"fitness" than on child-centered concerns).
160. 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Mrs. Gerrie Highto, grandmother).
161. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 100, at 6 (statement ofJohn M. McCabe, Legislative
Director, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) (suggesting that while
grandparent visitation "has been proposed in terms of grandparents' rights... grandparents
may receive what may be characterized as a privilege more than a right").
162. The doctrine ofparenspatriaeis the basis for considering the best interests of the child
as the paramount issue in granting grandparent visitation rights. By looking after the child's
welfare, the state grants grandparents visitation with the child because the state has determined
that such contact is in the best interests of the child. See Roberts v. Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 481
(N.H. 1985) ('[T]he superior court, as an instrumentality of the state, may use its patens patriae
power to decide whether the welfare of the child warrants court-ordered visitation with
grandparents to whom close personal attachments have been made."); see also 1982 House
Hearing, supra note 1, at 76 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University Medical
Center) (underscoring that because excessive psychological turmoil for even one child is
unacceptable, it is important to make visitation decisions in context of parties involved).
163. See N.Y. DOM. IEL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1989) (providing that grandparent visitation
statutes are "not intended to give grandparents an absolute or automatic right of visitation but,
rather was designed to establish a procedural vehicle through which grandparents might assert
that visitation of the child or children is warranted").
164. 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 29 (statement of John H. Pickering, Chair,
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, American Bar Association) (asserting that highly
defined grandparent visitation guidelines both protect child and family and preventjudges from
overlooking relevant factors). The term 'visitation" is expansive, and usually denotes a custodial
interest held by a noncustodial parent. JUDrrH C. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1301 (3d ed. 1992). This broad term may cause some parents to fear that the courts are taking
some "right" from them and granting it to the grandparents. Perhaps, what grandparents
request can be more loosely defined as "access" to their grandchildren. Id. When grandparents
and grandchildren live far apart "access" may entail phone calls, letters, and occasional visits.
Id. Thus, it may be more appropriate and conciliatory to substitute the term "access" for the
more tainted term "visitation." This solution may assist grandparents secure the desired multi-
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grandparent would be in the best interests of the child.
To ensure uniform application of the law, standard criteria must
exist so that judges throughout the United States have uniform
guidelines to follow in determining the best interests of the child.165
These guidelines should allow courts to consider each family situation
independently. The guidelines, for example, should direct courts to
consider the nature of the relationship between the grandparent and
the child; if the relationship was a nurturing, caring relationship to
which the child was accustomed, the court should not arbitrarily sever
the relationship due to adoption" or family conflict. 67  The
court should also consider the relationship between the grandparents
and the child's parents. If the relationship is extremely volatile,
allowing the grandparents visitation rights may place the child in the
middle of an emotional battleground and not serve the child's best
interests." Finally, when both parents do not wish for the grand-
parents to have contact with the child, the court should respect their
right of parental autonomy.'69
Because courts are not the ideal domain for settling issues as
fraught with emotion as visitation,170 a model statute should require
that the parties involved in a visitation dispute attempt some type of
generational contact, and ease the apprehensions of parents who feel their rights are being
jeopardized by an expansive grant of "visitation." Id.
165. See Wilentz, Goldman and Spitzer Make Statement Regarding Senate Bill 774, PR NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (noting that central problem in draft
of New Jersey grandparent visitation statute is lack of standards or criteria to determine
application of grandparent visitation).
166. SeeLingwall v. Hoener, 483 N.E.2d 512, 516-17 (ill. 1985) (reporting that "child's need
for continuity in his relationships with people who may have played a significant nurturing role
in his life, and the effect of the termination of the child's relationship with the parent who has
relinquished his rights and responsibilities must also be considered"); People ex rel. Sibley v.
Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049,1052 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that "[b]y enacting [the visitation statute],
the Legislature has recognized that, particularly where a relationship between the grandparents
and the grandchild has been established, the child should not undergo the added burden of
being severed from his or her grandparents, who may provide the natural warmth, interest, and
support that will alleviate the child's misery"); see also supra notes 127-47 and accompanying text
(discussing grandparent visitation in the context of adoption).
167. Seesupranotes 91-107and accompanying text (discussinggrandparentvisitation disputes
resulting from intrafamily conflict).
168. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Dr. Andre Derdeyn, Director,
University of Virginia Child and Family Psychiatry Training Program) (recognizing that courts
do not fully comprehend significant and potentially destructive effects that loyalty conflicts can
have on children, regardless of whether it is conflict between two parents or parents and
grandparents). But see Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 355 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1976) (suggesting that
if animosity between parents and grandparents were sufficient reason to deny grandparents
visitation, then grandparent visitation statutes would accomplish very little, because without
acrimony, visitation would have been arranged by mutual agreement among parties).
169. See supra notes 35-60 and accompanying text (analyzing common-law protection and
limitations of parental autonomy).
170. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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mediation procedure before bringing the case before a judge.71
Such a requirement will likely reduce the trauma for the child, reduce
intrafamily litigation, and benefit the parties involved by encouraging
a conciliatory arrangement that does not require the enforcement
authority of a judge.172 Additionally, the court should assign the
child separate counsel, a guardian ad litem,173 to protect the child's
interests and to keep the battle over visitation from becoming a legal
and emotional tug of war. Both the parents and grandparents should
share the expense of a guardian ad litem. This additional measure will
ensure that the best interests of the individual child are promoted
throughout the process.174
V. MODEL GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
Proposed model laws have had a major impact on the develop-
171. 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Judith Areen, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine,
Georgetown University Medical Center) (noting that mediating solution to visitation dispute on
private basis is preferable to going before judge); see also id. at 105 (statement of Richard S.
Victor, attorney) (suggesting counseling in visitation disputes and recommending that parties'
willingness to cooperate in such procedure be considered by judge if attempts to reconcile are
not satisfactory, so that no single party can "control the proceedings by blatant avoidance of
attempts to reconcile the dispute").
172. See GRANDPARENT VISrTATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 126-27 (describing benefits of
mediation). The ABA handbook explains:
Mediation fosters values of great importance in the resolution of family disputes:
privacy and self-determination. One advantage of mediation is that it does not take
away any legal rights.., but it does add new possibilities for lasting solutions to family
problems. Grandparent visitation disputes... often cannot be resolved by a single
court hearing. But a mediated settlement, reached after intensive communication and
compromise between the parties, is more likely to survive over time. Mediation experts
suggest that referral is best done in the early stages of the legal dispute. Use of the
adversarial system tends to exacerbate the family dispute and further harden divisions
between the parties. Mediating the dispute at any point prior to a hearing on the
merits will certainly save the parties, and especially the children who may be called to
testify, the agonizing emotional experience of undergoing a trial involving sensitive
private matters.
Id.
173. A guardian ad litem is usually an attorney or social worker appointed by the court to
speak for the child's well-being. HOMER H. CLAR, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 795 (2d ed. 1988).
174. See Bahr v. Galonski, 257 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Wisc. 1977) (discussing value of guardian
ad litem in custody proceedings). The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained the reasons for
appointing a guardian ad litem:
The requirement that the children have independent legal representation does not in
any way suggest that the parents or the trial court were unmindful of the children's
welfare. Rather, it reflects the conviction that the children are best served by the
presence of a vigorous advocate free to investigate, consult with [the children] at
length, marshal evidence, and to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses. The judge
cannot play this role. Properly understood, therefore, the guardian ad litem does not
usurp the judge's function; he aids it.
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ment of family law. Individual states often incorporate these model
laws into existing statutes or adopt them in their entirety.17 To
help maintain the political viability of a model statute, each state must
have the opportunity to participate in its creation. 7 As this Com-
ment has recommended, the states should create a model grandpar-
ent visitation statute that individual states can adopt or use as a basis
for formulating or amending their current grandparent visitation
statutes. To encourage this process, this Comment proposes the
following model grandparent visitation statute:
1 77
Preambl. The goal of this statute is to maintain beneficial and
substantial relationships that grandchildren have with their
grandparents. Any benefit that grandparents may derive from the
implementation of this statute is secondary.
§I
(a) Grandparents may apply to the court of general jurisdiction
over family matters or domestic relations for visitation privileges
with their grandchildren.
(b) Any grandparent shall have the right to intervene in an
action involving the guardianship or custody of the child for the
purpose of obtaining the privilege to visit with the child.
§2
Upon petition for visitation, the court shall initiate professional
mediation among the grandparent(s) and the child's legal
parent(s) in an effort to create an amicable visitation agreement
through communication among the parties, to diminish animosity
175. See CRS REPORT, supra note 156, at 204 (noting that because of several controversial
elements, only eight states have adopted Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, but that all states
have adopted Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act); 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1,
at 77 (statement of Judith Areen, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and
Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University Medical Center)
(commenting that Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has had impact on development of family
law at state level); see also 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 100, at 3-4 (statement of John M.
McCabe, Legislative Director, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws)
(stating that primary activity of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) is to review all state family law and to propose uniform laws where need exists). The
NCCUSL has developed a variety of uniform statutes, including the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, the Uniform Parentage Act, the Uniform Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act,
the Uniform Marital Property Act, and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. Id. at 3-4.
176. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at77 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine,
Georgetown University Medical Center) (noting positive political aspects of creating model
statute with representatives from each state).
177. The proposed model grandparent visitation statute is not so much a radical departure
from the norm as it is a clear enunciation of factors to consider in making a fair determination
of visitation rights. By endorsing uniform adoption of a model grandparent visitation statute,
states would not be inhibited from experimenting with and altering the elements of the statute
to better fit the individual state's needs. To the contrary, states would have a common source
from which to derive policy and statutory elements.
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among the parties to the greatest extent possible, and to reduce
trauma for the child involved. 178
§3
If reasonable mediation efforts fail, the case may be brought
before ajudge. Where circumstances demonstrate that it would be
in the best interests of the child to grant grandparent(s) visitation
privileges, such privileges as the court and other appropriate
professional consultants deem reasonable will be granted."
§4
Where the child has lived peaceably with the grandparent(s) for
more that twelve consecutive months within the five year period
preceding the grandparents (s)' application for visitation privileges,
there will be a rebuttable presumption in favor of granting
grandparent visitation rights."s
§5
In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall
consider the following factors and provide written findings
accordingly:
(a) the love, affection, and other emotional ties that exist
between the grandparent(s) and the child;"8'
(b) the nature and quality of the relationship between the
grandparent(s) and the child, the length of time that such
relationship has existed, and the desirability of maintaining that
relationship;'
8 2
178. 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Judith Areen, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center, and Professor of Community and Family Medicine,
Georgetown University Medical Center) (observing that private mediation is always preferable
to trial resolution); see also id. at 87, 105 (statement of Richard S. Victor, attorney) (stating that
families will seek voluntary reconciliation of their disputes when legislation provides
grandparents with ability to seek court enforcement of their rights and recommending that
legislation prescribe mandatory counseling to assist families in resolving visitation disputes). See
generally GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 121-27 (advocating mediation as part
of settlement of grandparent visitation disputes).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.5(h) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (declaring that if mediation is
unsuccessful, parties will have opportunity to appear and settle matters in court).
180. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2a) (West 1992) (granting visitation rights to grandparents
when child has lived with them for 12 months or more but "is subsequently removed from the
home by his parents," and the court "finds that visitation rights would be in the best interests
of the child and would not interfere with the parent and child relationship"). See generally supra
notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing psychological impact of severing previously
formed grandparent-grandchild bond).
181. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (4) (1991) (requiring courts to consider "the love and
affection existing between the child and [the grandparent]"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §
1003 (2) (F) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring courts to consider parties' "capacities to give the child
love, affection and guidance"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(b) (1) (1989) (requiring courts to
consider "the love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the grandparents
involved and the child"); see also 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Richard
S. Victor, attorney) (proposing that emotional factors be considered in determining whether
visitation is in best interests of child).
182. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (requiring courts to consider "the
amount of personal contact between [petitioning grandparents] and the minor children"); FLA.
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(c) whether visitation will promote or disrupt the child's
psychological development;'
(d) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs
of the child;'
(e) the reasonable preference of the child, if the child is ten
years of age or if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age
and maturity to express a preference;"ta
(f) the wishes and opinions of the parent(s);'t a
(g) the willingness and ability of the petitioning grandparent(s)
to facilitate and encourage a close relationship among the child
and the parent(s);'
(h) the friction or animosity between the grandparent(s) and
the legal parent(s) of the child and the reasons behind such
acrimony, although consideration of this factor shall not be the sole
basis for denial of visitation privileges;'
t a
(i) whether the parties made a good faith effort to cooperate in
mediation proceedings;"t and
(j) any other consideration relevant to a fair andjust determina-
STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01 (2) (b) (Harrison Supp. 1992) (requiring courts to consider "length and
quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent or grandparents"); OR.
REv. STAT. § 109.121 (1) (a) (A) (1991) (conditioning visitation in part on whether grandparent
"has established or attempted to establish" ongoing relationship with child); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1013(b)(3) (1989) (requiring courts to weigh nature of grandparent-grandchild
relationship and "desirability of maintaining that relationship"); see also 1982 House Hearing, supra
note 1, at 74 (statement ofJudith Areen, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center,
and Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University Medical Center)
(advocating that presumption in favor of continued contact should be fortified by evidence of
established relationship between grandparents and grandchild); id. at 106-07 (statement of
Richard S. Victor, attorney) (maintaining that relationship between grandparent and grandchild
should be considered in visitation decision).
183. GRANDPARENT VsrrATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 122 (recommending that child's
psychological development be considered in determining what is in child's best interests).
184. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(1) (1991) (requiring courts to evaluate "physical,
emotional, religious, and social needs" of child in determining child's best interest); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 752.01(2) (d) (Harrison Supp. 1992) (requiring courts to consider mental and physical
health of child); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (4) (Michie Supp. 1993) (requiring courts to consider
"needs" of child).
185. ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (3) (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986);
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01(2) (c) (Harrison Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(b) (6)
(1989). See generally GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 123 (recommending that
court consider reasonable preference of child in determining whether to grant grandparent
visitation rights).
186. This factor addresses situations where both parents oppose grandparent visitation.
187. ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(6) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01(2) (a) (Harrison
Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(b)(7) (1989).
188. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 105-06 (statement of Richard S. Victor, attorney)
(suggesting that courts probe into reasons for animosity among parties).
189. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1003-A (West Supp. 1993) (requiring mediation of
visitation disputes and considering whether parties made good faith effort to resolve differences
through mediation); 1982 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 105 (statement of Richard S. Victor,
attorney) (proposing that courts consider willingness of parties to cooperate in mediation
proceedings).
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tion of visitation rights.'
§6
This visitation statute shall apply in cases where a child has been
adopted. Adoption shall not terminate the visitation rights of the
child's grandparent(s), as long as visitation remains in the best
interests of the child.191
§7
In an effort to promote the best interests of the child, the court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem.192 The grandparent(s) and the
legal parent(s) of the child shall share the costs of such counsel.
§8
If there is a significant change of circumstances, the grandpar-
ent(s) or legal parent(s) may petition the court to consider whether
visitation remains in the best interests of the child.1
9 3
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL GRANDPARENT VISITATION
STATUTE
A. The Best Interests of the Child Standard
A problem inherent in the best interests of the child standard is
that regardless of how many factors the courts consider, the analysis
190. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (9) (1991) (allowing courts to consider other "pertinent
factors"); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 752.01 (2) (f) (Harrison Supp. 1993) (authorizing consideration
of"[s]uch other factors as are necessary in the particular circumstances"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
107.2(9) (Michie Supp. 1993) (authorizing courts to consider any factors necessary to determine
best interests of child).
191. See supra notes 127-47 and accompanying text (discussing grandparent visitation in
context of adoption). This provision of the model statute eliminates the artificial limitation that
terminates visitation rights upon adoption or upon adoption by someone other than a
stepparent. See supra note 128 (citing state statutes that terminate visitation upon adoption).
These are artificial limitations because even when the child is adopted by strangers, it may be
in the child's best interests to continue grandparent visitation in order to acclimate the child
to his or her new surroundings.
192. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(b) (1991) (suggesting use of guardian adlitem); GRANDPARENT
VIsITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 128 (summarizing ABA recommendation that effective
representation by guardian ad litem can affect mediation, and thus protect child from emotional
turmoil that accompanies protracted litigation).
193. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117(4) (Supp. 1993) ("The court may make an order
modifying or terminating grandchild visitation rights whenever such an order would serve the
best interests of the child."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/607(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(allowing court to modify visitation order whenever modification would be in best interests of
child); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1014-15 (1989) (allowing court to modify or terminate any
order of visitation and that "[a]bsent a real, substantial and unanticipated change of
circumstances, no person whose petition under this section is denied with prejudice may file
another petition under this section sooner than one year after that denial"); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) ("The court may modify an order granting or
denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.
."). This requirement, among other things, would allow parents who adopt a child to petition
to end grandparent visitation.
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will never be complete.'94 Each year, states add factors for courts
to evaluate in determining the best interests of the child. 95 But
considering that the majority of states do not specify factors for
determining the best interests of the child, 96 some guidelines are
better than none at all. By providing judges with guidelines, states
can prevent judges from relying on personal views and private
agendas.'97 Statutorily articulated factors are more likely to reflect
the will of the public because, compared to judges, the legislature is
more accountable to the public and more accustomed to incorporat-
ing public sentiment in its decisions.'98 While far from perfect, the
best interests of the child standard remains the preferred standard in
determining child visitation rights.
1. Consideration of the grandparent-parent relationship
Unlike many current state statutes, the proposed model statute
194. See 1991 House Hearing, supra note 3, at 49 (statement of Leslie I. Levine, attorney)
(commenting that "the legislature can sit up all night and come up with criteria, [but] they are
always going to miss some, and those that they have enumerated will get undue emphasis and
those that they have left out will not receive any emphasis because the judge will then be
bound"); Mnookin, supra note 21, at 289 ("An inquiry about what is best for a child often yields
indeterminate results because of the problems of having adequate information, making the
necessary predictions, and finding an integrated set of values by which to choose.").
195. SeeALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (7) (1991) (noting that most recent addition to factors
considered in determining best interests of child is family's history of abuse or neglect).
196. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1993);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1991); CAL CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/607(b) (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021
(Baldwin 1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 9-102 (1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney
1989); OKiLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp.
1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(4) (West 1993).
197. See Fern _ndez, supra note 18, at 129 (arguing that "broad discretion allows for an
unarticulated, private agenda to govern a dispute in which the court has no personal interest
and is largely incapable of supervising on a day-to-day basis" and noting that manyjudges may
be influenced by fact that they themselves are grandparents). But see Carl Schneider, Discretion
Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2247
(1991) (noting that "[d]iscretion can lead to better decisions because they can be tailored to
the particular circumstances of each case"). Schneider argues:
Discretion gives the decisionmaker flexibility to do justice. It does so not just by
allowing a decisionmaker to heed all the individual facts that ought to affect a decision
but that could not be listed by rules. ... Discretion may also conduce to better
decisions by discouraging overly bureaucratic ways of thinking, since they often are
born of too rigid an insistence on writing elaborate rules and on following them with
too mechanical regularity.
Id.
198. See Fernindez, supra note 18, at 129 ("Allowing a judge to impose personal values
arguably is worse than directing him or her to impose values that a legislature has chosen,
because a judge is less personally accountable to the public than is the representative
legislature."). Although some state judges are elected, they are less accountable to the public
than legislatures because, unlike legislatures, they do not receive abundant public comment and
are not forced to compromise with others in an effort to pass a bill.
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considers several important aspects of the relationship among the
child's parents and grandparents. Although grandparent visitation
can be beneficial for a child,1" the contact between the grandpar-
ents and a grandchild is dictated by the child's parents. As a result,
the relationship between the grandparents and the child's parents
often determines how beneficial visitation will be for the child.2"°
When the grandparent-parent relationship is contentious, that strain
may expand into a legal battle for visitation, which can become a
battle for the child's affections and amplify the acrimony among the
adults." 1 Beginning the petition for visitation with mediation may
help the parties come to an accord which is both mutually agreeable
to the parties and beneficial to the child." 2 If mediation is not
successful, the court will then consider the grandparent-parent
relationship in determining whether visitation will be in the child's
best interest.
2. Child's preference
Considering the child's preference in grandparent visitation
disputes makes practical sense because the child's happiness should
be the ultimate concern in such disputes. Utilizing the child's
preference as a factor, however, does create some problems. For
instance, the child may want to visit with a grandparent because the
grandparent provides the child with special treats and attention. A
child in this situation is not in any position to determine objectively
whether visitation is in his or her best interest.0 Additionally,
expressing a preference that is contrary to the wishes of a parent can
create a disturbing loyalty conflict for the child." 4 By limiting
consideration of the child's preference to cases involving children at
least ten years of age, courts are able to contemplate this factor only
199. See Thompson et al., supra note 1, at 1218-19 (discussing benefit to child of having
access to grandparent as playmate, family historian, and mentor).
200. See Matthews & Sprey, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that most significant aspect of
grandparent-grandchild bond is grandparent-parent relationship); Thompson et al., supra note
17, at 1219 (determining that nature of grandparent-parent relationship significantly affects
benefits and nature of grandparent-grandchild relationship).
201. See Derdeyn, supra note 7, at 279 (positing that when visitation battle becomes contest
for child's affection, such contest can be detrimental to child) (citing Commonwealth x e!.
McDonald v. Smith, 85 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952)).
202. See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing benefits and drawbacks of
mediation on visitation proceedings).
203. See AREEN, supra note 164, at 560 (questioning how child is to determine which parent
would be more fit in custodial situation).
204. SeeARtEEN, supra note 164, at 560 (discussing loyalty conflict and "terrible responsibility"
that expressing preference may impose on child).
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when children are generally capable of making such decisions.
20 5
The diminution of a potential loyalty conflict and the child's personal
investment in his or her own happiness establish the child's prefer-
ence as a valuable factor.
B. The Guardian Ad Litem
As custody and visitation hearings increasingly concentrate on the
best interests of the child, the use of guardians ad litem has expanded
markedly.2°u The use of a guardian ad litem has been criticized as
an unnecessary expense that simply adds another person to an already
complicated domestic dilemma.2°' The guardian ad litem, however,
can serve as an objective third party who can investigate the family
dispute more completely than a judge can. Further, a guardian ad
litem would ensure that the child's interests are not overlooked during
the visitation determination, and can encourage resolution of the
visitation problem on a more amicable basis.20 ' The potential exists
for the guardian ad litem's role to become overbroad and overempha-
sized by the judge, but this danger can be prevented by allowing the
parties to cross-examine the guardian and any witnesses that the
guardian relied on in forming his or her evaluation, and by requiring
the guardian to submit a written report of his or her findings.
2
0
9
205. But see AREEN, supra note 164, at 560-61 (preferring maturity test for child rather than
chronological test and questioning whether child's best interests should be viewed from long-
term or short-term perspective because "conditions that make a person happy at age seven may
have adverse consequences at age thirty").
206. See GRANDPARENT VISrrATON MANUAL, supra note 7, at 128 (noting that Wisconsin and
New Hampshire, for example, now mandate appointment of guardians ad litem in contested
custody cases).
207. See Mnookin, supra note 21, at 13 (criticizing use of guardian ad litem). Mr. Mnookin
argues:
[T]he child advocate is in no better position than the judge to determine the child's
best interest. While he [sic] may have acquired a great deal of information regarding
the past relationships among the parties, he [sic] cannot make predictions regarding
the future of those relationships .... The result can only be an uncertain and perhaps
unwarranted position or the substitution of the advocate's own feelings and values for
the 'position of his [sic] client.'
So long as the best interest test remains the standard in private custody disputes...
the use of a child's advocate will probably grow. However, the appointment of an
advocate will not make judicial decisions easier nor will the predicted results be any
more accurate.
Id.
208. See GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at 128 (extolling benefits of
guardian ad item in grandparent visitation proceedings).
209. Cf. Collins v. Collins, 324 S.E.2d 82, 85 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that failure to
make report of guardian ad litem available and to allow cross-examination is reversible error).
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C. Mediation
Mediation is a positive alternative to courtroom litigation that
addresses both the legal and emotional components of family
disputes."' Mediation is not an adjudicatory process; rather, the
parties attempt to achieve a resolution suitable to the family's
particular desires and needs.2 ' Because it is less adversarial than
litigation, mediation provides numerous benefits to the family: it is
less expensive than litigation, it provides a "personalized model for
dispute resolution,"22 and it helps the parties cooperate with each
other." And compared to other dispute resolution mechanisms,
mediation minimizes state intervention in the family. 4 The state
also benefits from mediation because resolving family disputes
through mediation reduces the case burden on the court system. 15
While mediation clearly has its advantages, it also has several
disadvantages. Mediation does not use all of the defined procedures
that accompany judicial proceedings, and as a result, the mediation
process might fail to treat all of the parties fairly.216 In addition,
210. SeeJay Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Woikable Alternative, inJUDITH AREEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 851 (3d ed. 1992) (asserting that mediation recognizes marital
dissolution as "both a matter of the heart and of the law").
211. See id. at 853 (noting that mediation does not emphasize winning or losing but instead
focuses on developing some "resolution that best meets the family's own unique needs").
Mediation is particularly effective in family disputes:
[T] he mere presence of a third party tends to put the parties on their good behavior,
[so] that the mediator can direct [the parties] verbal exchanges away from recrimina-
tion and toward the issues that need to be faced, that by receiving separate and
confidential communications from the parties [the mediator] can gradually bring into
the open issues so deep-cutting that the parties themselves had shared a tacit taboo
against any discussion of them and that, finally, [the mediator] can by his management
of the interchange demonstrate to the parties that it is possible to discuss divisive issues
without either rancor or evasion.
Lon Fuller, Mediation Its Forms and Functions, 44 U.S.C. L. REV. 305, 314 (1971).
212. Folberg, supra note 210, at 852.
213. Folberg, supra note 210, at 852.
214. See Folberg, supra note 210, at 853 (attesting that mediation allows families to make
decisions for themselves and encourages self-determination, thereby reaffirming "the dignity and
importance of the family as a self-governing unit"). Folberg also points out that state intrusion
into the decisionmaking role of the parents makes the family process less likely to operate
independently in the future and, thus, increases the likelihood of continued state regulation
through court-imposed orders. Id.; see also GRANDPARENT VISITATION MANUAL, supra note 7, at
126 (asserting that mediation fosters privacy and self-determination, both of which are important
in resolving family disputes).
215. Folberg, supra note 210, at 851-58 (acknowledging and describing benefits of
mediation).
216. See Folberg, supra note 210, at 854 (explaining that mediation "lacks the precise and
perfected checks and balances that are the principal benefit of the adversary process" and that
"[t]he purposeful 'a-legal' character of the mediation creates a constant risk of overreaching
and dominance by the more knowledgeable, powerful or less emotional party"); see also Daniel
Crouch, TheDark Sidels Still Unexplored 4 FAM. ADVOc. 27,33 (1982) (suggesting that mediation
may simply add another layer to process that is already long and costly, and that one party's
ignorance as to how adjudicatory proceeding would handle dispute usually benefits other party).
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mediation considers the emotional elements of the family dispute;
while this aspect of mediation makes it attractive to families, it is
sometimes difficult to balance the emotional concerns with the legal
considerations. 17  Further, mediation strives for compromise, but
in certain circumstances, compromise may be neither appropriate nor
feasible." 8 Mediation does not magically resolve all problems and
leave every party satisfied. The benefits of allowing a family to resolve
its own disputes and of limiting the psychological damage that a full-
scale trial could have on a child, however, make mediation a positive
contribution to the resolution of grandparent visitation disputes.
CONCLUSION
With increasing regularity, children find themselves the subject of
legal disputes among family members. The toll that a legal visitation
battle takes on a child is alarming. Domestic strife, always emotional,
is especially disturbing to a child.
To alleviate the stress experienced by all parties involved in disputes
over visitation rights, state legislatures need to provide courts with
clearly defined guidelines for granting grandparent visitation rights.
Currently, in deciding whether to grant grandparent visitation rights,
courts attempt to determine what is in the best interests of the child.
This noble endeavor is often defeated because legislatures fail to
define how courts should determine such interests. A model
grandparent visitation statute that would respect parental autonomy
and establish clear, well-defined guidelines for determining when
grandparent visitation would be in the best interests of the child is
necessary. Adoption by all states and the District of Columbia of such
a statute would ensure consistent and fair treatment for all parties and
minimize trauma for the child.
217. See Folberg, supra note 210, at 854.
218. See Folberg, supra note 210, at 856 (recognizing that some demands and expectations
that cleave families are so emotionally harmful, either intentionally or from "emotional
blindness," that compromise should not be realized, and mediator must be ready to facilitate
appreciation of this possibility "and not hide behind the easy rubric that all positions can be
compromised").
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